The USAAF was interested in its own independence once the
War was over and so concentrated its efforts on strategic bombing as the
justification for such. I cannot find a
reference to this at hand, but it has been recorded (by Kenney) that when the
CCS ordered the creation of an independent Strategic Air Force in the Pacific
in the build-up for DOWNFALL, MacArthur called Kenney and protested, as
MacArthur was REALLY dedicated to consolidated command. MacArthur asked Kenney to protest the intrusion
of this into the new Far East Command structure, and Kenney just laughed and
told MacArthur that, if he (Kenney) protested, MacArthur would be dealing with
a new Air Commander the next day, as he would be fired. Kenney ensured that MacArthur had priority of
targets under his control for DOWNFALL but that was as far as Arnold would go.
The reason that the United States Army Strategic Air Forces,
Pacific was established is that there would be two very long range bomber air
forces and a headquarters to coordinate them was necessary. This goes back to
the British arrangement in WWII. The British had established a Chiefs of Staff
Committee which directed RAF Bomber Command's campaign against German
industries. When the USAAF Eighth Air Force came to England in 1942, it fitted
very well into this system. This arrangement was formally recognized after the
issuance of the Casablanca directive on 21 Jan 1943 which put the Combined
Bomber Offensive (CBO) under direct control of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).
This arrangement worked well in Europe because the theater
was an Army theater with only two players. The Pacific was another story.
There were three theater commanders in the Pacific,
Stillwell, Nimitz and Macarthur, and none of them had shown himself to be an
enthusiastic advocate of the mission for which the B-29 had been designed and
built and the USAAF was reluctant to give these commanders control of it. The
British also wanted the CCS to have a say because the B-29s would be based in
India initially but General Arnold maintained that the B-29 would be strictly
an American affair and control of the B-29s should be under the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS). After discussion with the British, they agreed that there would be
no CCS control
The Joint Planning Staff (JPS) began work on a paper
defining the task and command structure of the B-29 bomber offensive. After
much discussion and draft papers, the JPS sent a paper to the Joint Strategic
Survey Committee which forwarded it to the JCS on 18 Mar 1944. Admiral William
D. Leahy, Chairman of the JCS, recommended its approval but General Arnold
offered as an alternative certain proposals made by Admiral Ernest King, Chief
of Naval Operations and the Navy representative on the JCS, calling for the
creation of "an air force, known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force,
to be commanded by the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, who will be the
executive agent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." As a result, the plan was
approved and Arnold would command the force, acting under specific directives
which he, as a member of the JCS, would help to frame.
The new paper constituted the formal charter under which the
Twentieth Air Force would operate, i.e.:
1. A strategic Army air force, designated the Twentieth, was
to be established, to operate directly under the JCS with the Commanding
General, AAF as executive agent to implement their directives for the
employment of Very Long Range (VLR) bombers;
2. Major decisions concerning deployment, missions, and
target objectives were to be made by the JCS and executed by the Commanding
General, AAF;
3. Should a strategic or tactical emergency arise, theater
or area commanders might utilize VLR bombers for purposes other than the
primary mission, immediately informing the JCS;
4. Responsibility for providing suitable bases and base
defense would rest with theater or area commanders as directed by the JCS;
5. To obviate confusion in the field, the JCS would vest
theater or area commanders with logistical obligations for Twentieth Air Force
units operating from their commands, with the responsibility of establishing
equitable and uniform administrative policies, and with the duty of providing
local coordination to avoid conflicts between theater forces operating under
general directives of the JCS amid VLR forces operating under their special
directives;
6. JCS directives for VLR operations would be so framed as
to minimize possible friction within theaters; and
7. Arnold was to have direct communication with VLR leaders
in the field, advising appropriate theater commanders of communications thus
exchanged.
The B-29s would attack Japanese bases and homeland under JCS
command.
Now we jump forward to summer 1945. The Twentieth Air Force
is based in the Mariana Islands and has been bombing Japan for over six months.
With the capture of Okinawa, the USAAF wants to establish B-29 bases there
which would allow the bombers to carry larger bomb loads and hit more targets
because of the shorten distance to targets. So, the Eighth Air Force is
transferred without personnel and equipment to Okinawa along with its
commander, Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle. When you have more than one
air force in a theater, a controlling organization was always established. In
the Southwest Pacific Area, there was the Far East Air Forces; in England,
there was the Allied Expeditionary Air Force and the U.S. Strategic Air Forces
in Europe; and in the Mediterranean, you had the Mediterranean Allied Air
Force. So by moving a second B-29 outfit to the Pacific, it is logical that the
U.S. Army Strategic Air Forces, Pacific, be established.
The Eighth Air Force was in the process of converting to
B-29's on V-J Day. Doolittle and Spaatz
were already on Okinawa, I believe. The
Twentieth AF was already equipped with B-29's on Saipan and Tinian. The British Bomber Command Tiger Force was to
have been equipped with Lancaster bombers bearing rather unsightly saddle tanks
to extend the range, as these aircraft would have flown from the southern end
of Okinawa.
The Twentieth Air Force was activated in Washington, DC on 4
Apr 1944.
The Twentieth would be assigned two subordinate units, the
XX and XXI Bomber Commands.
The XX Bomber Command was activated on 20 Nov 43 at Smoky
Hill AAFld, Kansas, assigned to the Second Air Force for training, and shipped
out for India in the spring of 1944 after training was completed. The
subordinate unit was the 58th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy). HQ XX Bomber
Command was established at Kharagpur, India on 28 Mar 44 and the command was
assigned to the Twentieth Air Force in Apr 44. This unit was tasked with control
of all B-29 units in India. By Mar 45, all of the tactical units of this
command had moved to the Mariana Islands and in Jun 45 and reassigned to the
XXI Bomber Command. The command began a movement to Okinawa arriving there on 7
Jul 45.
The XXI Bomber Command was activated on 1 Mar 44 at Smoky
Hill AAFld, Kansas, assigned to the Second Air Force for training, and shipped
out for the Mariana Islands in October 1944. HQ was established at Harmon
Field, Guam on 2 December 1944, and was assigned to the Twentieth Air Force.
This unit was tasked with control of all B-29 units in the Mariana Islands.
Everything changed on 16 July 1945. On that date:
1. The United States Army Strategic Air Forces, Pacific was
activated on Guam, with General Carl Spaatz as Commanding General (Spaatz
arrived on Guam on 29 July 1945). This unit was to exercise operational and
administrative control of the two B-29 units in the Pacific, i.e., the Eighth
and Twentieth Air Forces. This was the same system that had been used in Europe
where the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe exercised control over the two
USAAF heavy bomber units in Europe, i.e., the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces.
This new unit absorbed the personnel of HQ Army Air Force Pacific Ocean Area
which was inactivated.
2. HQ Eighth Air Force was established on Okinawa. This unit
had been transferred from High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, England, to Okinawa
without personnel and equipment. Lieutenant General James H. Doolittle assumed
command on 19 July 1945.
3. The XX Bomber Command on Okinawa was inactivated and the
personnel and equipment were assigned to HQ Eighth Air Force.
4. HQ Twentieth Air Force was established at Harmon Field,
Guam, with Major General Curtis Emerson LeMay in command (LeMay had been
commander of the XXI Bomber Command). This unit had been transferred from
Washington, DC without personnel and equipment. The unit remaining in
Washington was redesignated United States Army Strategic Air Forces, Pacific,
Rear.
5. The XXI Bomber Command was inactivated and the personnel
and equipment were assigned to HQ Twentieth Air Force.
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