The German electrical power sector as an Allied military target:

The breached Möhne Dam after the bombing of Operation Chastise on the night of 16–17 May 1943.

The Möhne Reservoir — or Moehne Reservoir — is an artificial lake in North Rhine-Westphalia, some 45 km east of Dortmund, Germany. The lake is formed by the damming of two rivers, Möhne and Heve, and with its four basins stores as much as 135 million cubic metres of water.
The dam was built between 1908 and 1913 to help control floods, regulate water levels on the Ruhr river downstream, and generate hydropower.


When U.S. military planners first began analyzing Germany’s economic and military production potentials, the targeting of Germany’s electrical power sector was a top priority. The Air War Plans Division (AWPD) submitted numerous position papers and proposals for consideration. In August of 1941, the U.S. Army Air Corps submitted its first formal document, AWPD/1, which included an analysis as to how Germany could be defeated through an aerial bombing campaign, how civilian/military morale could be affected to cause an economic collapse of Germany - in addition to focusing in on U.S. military production concerns. As one could expect, Germany’s electrical power production and transmission capabilities was listed as the Nr. 2 priority in AWPD/1 (gaining air-superiority was the top priority). For example, the analysts of AWPD/1 believed that by taking out 50 key German electrical power generation sites, the German war production effort would be presented with an immediate 40% production loss, morale would suffer and Germany’s will to continue to fight would be significantly eroded. 

In August of 1942, the second AWPD document was prepared - AWPD/42. U.S. military priorities now focused on the Nr. 1 priority - gaining air supremacy over Germany. New guidelines documented in AWPD/42 placed the destruction of German aircraft manufacturing sites above the need to neutralize Germany’s electrical power production efforts. In addition, the need to support an Allied ground assault against mainland Europe, required that military targets, military production centers, important transportation nodes, etc., be accorded higher priorities than Germany’s electrical power sector. 

That said, AWPD/42 came under intense scrutiny by members of the U.S. military’s Joint Intelligence Committee. Their key concerns focused on many of the assumptions AWPD/42 made re the German war effort. To better address these raised issues, a new component was created at Army Air Force headquarters - the Bombing Advisory Committee (BAC) (later this was changed to the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA)). The newly established COA was also given a new mission statement, to analyze at what point a bombing campaign would allow for a successful invasion of Hitler’s “Festung Europa”. Interestingly, the COA mission statement differed greatly from the stated goals of AWPD/1 (how to knock-out Germany, by attacking its will to fight - and accomplishing that goal by neutralizing the threats posed by the German electrical power sector). 

COA came up with a number of interesting conclusions - which ultimately led to a downgrading of the priority levels accorded to Germany’s electrical power production and T&D sector. COA analysts estimated that Germany had electrical power reserves of anywhere between 15-20%, which she could tap into if many of her primary electrical power production sites were taken off-line for whatever reason. This was a significant reserve capacity. In addition, they noted that German Luftwaffe efforts to neutralizing British electrical power plants were not as effective as German planners may have wished for - even though Luftwaffe priority-level targets included British industrial sites, electrical power production facilities, rail yards and port facilities. The British electrical power sector did not suffer greatly due to German aerial attack efforts. COA analysts believed that by striking against German military production centers first, the war could be ended sooner. In short, COA analysts placed Germany’s electrical power sector as priority Nr. 13. 

COA’s recommendations were then forwarded to London, where they were amalgamated with the priorities of the USAAF/RAF Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) plan (an entity, which was established as a result of the 1943 Casablanca meeting). The CBO plan was actually more akin to a guideline or policy type paper than it was a firm target selection listing. Within the framework of the USAAF/RAF CBO, the following priorities were identified (including many others):
1. German submarine construction sites
2. German aircraft production efforts
3. German transportation networks
4. German oil production capabilities
5. Other war production targets 

When the USAAF/RAF CBO was officially launched on 10 June 1943, the German electrical power sector, as a top priority target was essentially “off of the target list” (proverbially speaking that is). German electrical power plants and substations were indeed hit during the war, but not because they were priority targets, more because they were alternate or convenience targets. 

A change in Allied strategic bombing priorities is one of the leading reasons as to why the Allied powers never really focused on the German electrical power sector as a top priority target during the war. 

In November of 1944, President Roosevelt signed an executive order, which authorized the creation the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) Commission. This commission was charged with conducting a post-war analysis effort of the strategic bombing campaign. 

Much to everyone’s surprise, the one of the USSBS reports stated that had the German electrical power sector had remained a top military target - a reduction of electrical power in Germany would have had devastating consequences on the German war effort. In reality, Germany only had a few large-sized electrical power generating sites available and the reserve electrical power capacity was near zero. The German T&D grids were apparently not as advanced as German spin-doctors of the era claimed them to be. 

It also need be noted that many of Germany’s factories operated their own electrical power plants. Though often small in size, one would have to target both the generating site and the manufacturing plant in order to effectively neutralize that particular site. By taking out only the factory, electrical power would continue to service the surviving or repaired equipment.

German Transport System WWII

The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 was perhaps the most significant event in modern history. From the defeat of Germany, evolved the world we know today. Significantly the freedom we have to express our opinions and to debate topics such as this are the direct result of the actions of millions of brave men and women who fought to defeat Hitler's regime. We owe a great debt to the many who paid the ultimate sacrifice for what we take for granted today.

As much as the defeat of Germany was achieved by force of arms from the Allied nations, defeat also came from within. Germany was not adequately prepared for war in 1939, and the early victories were achieved through the relatively new tactics of Blitzkrieg, modern equipment, superb training and leadership, ineptitude of the enemy and plain good luck.

Significantly Germany's ill preparedness for war manifested itself in the first months of war and by December 1940 was readily apparent in the German transport system which was buckling under the demands of the German armed forces. This was no more apparent than with the Reichbahn, the German railways, an amalgamation of the former state railway systems.

The Reichbahn was forced to absorb a vast network of railways in varying condition, and locomotives and rolling stock that were often incompatible. As there were few common designs the new railway system was burdened by operational problems, increased and often duplicated costs and a maintenance headache of mammoth proportions.

Much of the plant and equipment was built in the late nineteenth century and the early 1900's and had not been modernized because of the Great War, the chaos of the Weimar republic and the Depression. As much as a massive modernization programme was begun, with a view of upgrading track and other facilities, the construction of standardized locomotives and rolling stock, it was not complete by the beginning of war. This problem grew as the war progressed as they advanced deeper into the Soviet Union. Because of the restricted loading gauge and the increased demands of the German forces, the Reichbahn was forced into a never ending cycle of building more locomotives and rolling stock to achieve the task.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union the demands on the railways reached crippling proportions, culminating in the coal shortage of winter 1941/1942. There was no shortage of coal, but a lack of coal wagons which had been appropriated by the Wehrmacht and due to the chaotic conditions at the railheads behind the front these wagons were simply tipped off the tracks to allow space for the following trains.

Equally problematic for the Germans were the loss of over 100,000 trucks and 200,000 horses between the opening of Barbarossa and March 1942. These losses were to have an impact against the chances of success some six months later at Stalingrad.

It was clear such a situation could not continue otherwise the rail system would soon collapse. Albert Speer (Minister for Armaments and Munitions Production) and Erhard Milch (Director of Air Armament & state secretary in the Air Ministry) were charged with setting the railways right, and with brutal efficiency they cleared out the railway administration, sacking the incompetent heads of the railways and throwing out the rule book. To alleviate some of the operational problems, longer and heavier trains were run at faster speeds. An accelerated programme of converting the Russian broad gauge system to the German standard gauge system, the construction of longer passing loops and new railway yards was set in motion.

Short term measures alleviated the crisis, but only a massive construction programme would provide a permanent solution. The effects of the enforced intervention was highly visible in 1943 with the construction of over 4,500 locomotives and nearly 52,000 freight wagons. As formidable as these figures may seem they were never enough to resolve the crisis that engulfed the Deutsche Reichsbahn from 1939 to 1945.

Rheinmetal Borsig were charged with building a family of Austerity class locomotives, all based on standardized designs. One of these locomotives was so successful over ten thousand were built and many remained in service until the end of steam operations in Europe.

All these measures were only partially or such successful as the demands from the various fronts, in particular the Eastern Front, continued to place undue strain on a system that was not designed for such traffic. To transport a fully equipped panzer division could require up to three hundred trains. Multiply that out over the entire Eastern front, coupled with the normal supply demands and it is easy to see why the German railways could not keep up with the demands of war.

In addition the railways had to compete for labour, cope with the burden of transporting Jews, which coincidentally often had priority over trains heading for the front. Until the bombing campaign against the railways intensified in 1943 the system held together. Most aiming points for these raids were on the town centres, where the central railway stations and yards were situated, so as the bombing tempo increased, so did the damage and disruption.

As much as the emergency measures freed up the traffic to and from the Eastern front it was obvious the chain of patched up railway lines leading to the railhead on the river Chir over 100 kilometers west of Stalingrad were incapable of supporting German forces. The track was not well ballasted or in good condition, slowing trains considerably. The Luftwaffe used four trains per day, but this was not enough and many supplies, especially fuel were flown into German held airbases. Further compounding the problems were a rail yard too small to cope with the traffic and the resulting congestion placed great strain on the largely horse drawn vehicles supplying German troops in Stalingrad.

This situation was compounded in late October 1942 when it was obvious the Soviets were preparing an offensive against the flanks of the German forces. To reinforce the 3rd Romanian army, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer division with two infantry divisions to transfer from France on the 4th November. Nearly one thousand train loads were required for this move east and it was nearly one month later these forces arrived, long after the Soviet offensive had surrounded Paulus' 6th army.

The situation was hardly better in the buildup for Operation Citadel, with lengthy delays of moving the troops and equipment forward. On a smaller scale the sheer difficulties in transporting the new Tiger tanks to the front caused delays, that were only resolved with a combination of ingenuity, skill and a lot of sweat.

By mid 1943 the Allied bomber offensive was causing very real disruption for the railways. Although damage could be repaired relatively quickly by experienced crews, damage was becoming cumulative in some areas where bombing was frequent. Of added concern were the rising casualties amongst train crews, mechanical and maintenance staff along with the various administrative branches that kept the trains running. While the personal strength reached over one and a half million by the end of 1943, the replacement of skilled personal was not easy, as a consequence the standard of maintenance gradually declined and the accident rate which had been on the rise since the beginning of the war, worsened.

This was compounded in early 1944 when after the defeat of the Jagdwaffe in February-March, American fighters after completing escort duties were allowed to attack targets of opportunity. They were so successful in shooting up anything that moved, the Deutsche Reichsbahn reported in June the daily average number of trains wrecked in May by marauding Allied fighters was over forty trains per day! This loss rate was outstripping German production of locomotives and rolling stock, already in decline to the increasing demands of the German armed forces. Now repair crews had to range far and wide over the German countryside, clearing train wrecks and repairing track. The destruction of railway bridges became a further dislocation as these were harder to repair. Another grave concern was the massive loss of experienced train crews, placing further strain on the overburdened system. A worse situation existed in the occupied countries, especially France where the railway system had been damaged beyond repair by Allied airpower in preparation for the D-Day landings. Without the railways the German army was forced to endure lengthy and dangerous road marches attempting to reach the battlefronts.

Fortunately for the Deutsche Reichsbahn Allied air support for the invading forces diverted much airpower away from German targets, however day and night bombing of German cities continued to pummel the railway system. Though the railways operated right till the collapse of the Third Reich, the ability to adequately supply German armed forces in the chaos of the collapse was no fault of the railway crews and staff who performed Herculean efforts to keep the trains running.

The German railways, like German industry was not prepared for war in 1939, and incompetence and poor planning led to the crisis of early 1942. The efforts to alleviate the situation, while tackled with vigour and considerable expense would never make up the shortfalls of the early war years, ensuring the German armed forces could never be adequately supplied to fight a protracted war.

A common factor soon appeared, especially on the Western front, where German armoured columns were forced to drive to the battlefronts because the railways were no longer operational.

By war's end the German railways were a barely functioning shambles, though some services were still operating remarkably efficiently. With the flow of spare parts, replacement troops, fuel, munitions and rations slowed to a trickle by the collapse of the railways the effectiveness of German forces decreased dramatically.

Six years earlier the German railways were hard pressed to supply Germany's war needs and they never were able to. Without an adequate supply chain, no nation can win a war.