Avro Lancaster from Tiger Force
The BIG PLAN was that the two air forces would each have
five B-29 wings, a fighter command and a service command with a depot.
Of course, the Twentieth Air Force had been flying missions
for over six months but the units of the Eighth were nearing completion when
the Japanese surrendered. The Eighth Air Force units on Ryukyu Islands when the
Japanese surrendered were:
333d Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) at Kadena since 5 August
435th Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy)
460th
Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy)
507th
Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy)
346th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy) at Kadena since 7 August
461st
Bombardment Squadron (Very Heavy) since 13 Aug
462d Bombardment
Squadron (Very Heavy) since 13 Aug
463d Bombardment
Squadron (Very Heavy) since 18 Aug
301st Fighter Wing on Ie Shima Island assigned 15 August
318th Fighter
Group attached on Ie Shima
19th
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
73d
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
333d
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
413th Fighter
Group on Ie Shima
1st
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
21st
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
34th
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
507th Fighter
Group on Ie Shima
463d
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
464th
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
465th
Fighter Squadron with P-47Ns
The plan was that both the Eighth and Twentieth Air Forces
would have five bomb wings assigned. The Twentieth Air Force already had five
bomb wings which are listed below. The 58th Bomb Wing was originally assigned
to the XX Bomber Command in India and moved to the Marianas in 1945. The date
indicates when they arrived in the Marianas.
58th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) (29 Mar 45)
73d Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) (24 Aug 44)
313th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) (24 Dec 44)
314th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) (16 Jan 45)
315th Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) (5 Apr 45)
…and of course the 509th Composite Group which had arrived
on 29 May 1945 and was assigned to the 313th Bomb Wing.
The Fifth, Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces were all
assigned to the Far East Air Forces.
HQ Fifth Air Force had moved to Okinawa in July 1945 along
with their subordinate units and their main targets were on Kyushu. I cannot
say that all Fifth Air Force units were in Okinawa but I believe it was the
majority of them.
HQ Thirteenth Air Force was still on Leyte, Philippine
Islands, and I think the plan was to keep it in the Philippines to control the
Japanese in the Southwest Pacific.
I found the following in Volume 6 of THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN
WORLD WAR II
"MacArthur promptly assumed command as Commander-in-Chief
Army Forces Pacific (CINCAFPAC). U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, it was
decided, would be retained as a legal fiction for the time being, and U.S. Army
Services of Supply, MacArthur's former logistical headquarters, was
discontinued: the functions of both were absorbed in a new headquarters, U.S.
Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC).
U.S. Army Forces Pacific Ocean Area (USAFPOA) was
discontinued and replaced by U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (AFMIDPAC). Far
East Air Forces (FEAF), presumably with General George C. Kenney at its head,
was to continue to serve as MacArthur's air command; for Army Air Forces
Pacific Ocean Area (AAFPOA) headquarters he had no use. This reorganization
assumed that Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) ultimately would be dissolved, with
all territory south of the Philippines, except for the U.S. fleet base in the
Admiralties, going to the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). Although the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) shared MacArthur's hope that this transfer might be
effected on or about 15 August 1945, Lord Mountbatten was hesitant to accept
the responsibility prior to the capture of Singapore. Discussion continued but
the transfer had not been completed at the time of the Japanese
surrender."
Included in this book is a map entitled AAFSWPA Areas of
Responsibility dated 1 Apr 45. The
Philippines and Netherlands East Indies plus the South China Sea were assigned
to AAFSWPA. The RAAF was responsible for all of the NEI except the western
quarter of Borneo. The Fifth Air Force was responsible for Luzon and Mindoro
and the Thirteenth Air Force was responsible for all of the southern Philippine
Islands and the western quarter of Borneo. The South China Sea, up to the
shoreline of Asia, was divided between the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces.
Seventh Air Force is a strange story. This was the former
Hawaiian Air Force that was devastated on 7 December 1941. It was rebuilt and
initially was a source of men and equipment during the Guadalcanal campaign
until the Thirteenth Air Force was activated in January 1943. The Seventh,
under Navy operational control, then made its way across the island hopping
campaign to the Marianas.
In August 1943, the Seventh Air Force was assigned to the U.
S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area; in August 1944, it was reassigned to the
newly activated Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Area which was under US Army
Forces, Pacific Ocean Area.
HQ VII Fighter Command moved from Hawaii to Iwo Jima in March
1945 and was attached to the Twentieth Air Force to provide fighter escort for
the B-29s.
When the U. S. Army Forces Pacific was activated in April 1945,
all USAAF units in the Pacific came under the command of this new unit and it
was decided to assign HQ Seventh Air Force to the Far East Air Forces
(FEAF). When it arrived on Okinawa from Saipan in July 1945,
the Seventh Air Force was reassigned to FEAF and the VII Fighter Command units
were reassigned to the Twentieth Air Force. One fighter wing was attached to
the VII Fighter Command but this wing was reassigned to the Eighth Air Force in
August 1945. I believe that by 15 August 1945, all of the Seventh Air Force
fighter units had been reassigned to other commands. This includes the two
night fighter squadrons equipped with P-61s on Iwo Jima, one assigned to HQ
Seventh Air Force and the other to US Forces, Middle Pacific.
The VII Bomber Command moved from Saipan to Okinawa in July 1945
and its A-26s, B-24s and B-25s attacked targets on Kyushu.
There were no plans to put B-17's back in the Pacific,
whence they had been withdrawn in 1943.
The three FEC Air Forces (Fifth, Seventh, and Thirteenth) all had B-24's
and the Thirteenth, had some B-32's as well
The Fourteenth AF in China remained outside of the mix and was
technically OPCON to SEAC though the control was minimal.
Targeting does remain problematic. As has been pointed out, there weren't many
strategic targets left to bomb (as Churchill was later to note about nuclear
warfare, "excess only serves to make the rubble bounce"), so the
heavy bombers would probably have been primarily used to interfere with
Japanese defensive measures making their efforts more tactical and operational
than doctrinally strategic. There would
have been a lot of mining of the seas around Japan to prevent reinforcements
from overseas forces such as the Kwangtung army in China, for instance, taking
out of bridges, destruction of supply depots and sea ports and the like.
The Postwar analysis of ETO and MTO and Pacific bombings
revealed that these were effective but not nearly to the extent claimed.
USSBS analyses had led to a complete reorientation of
targeting, shifting from making the rubble bounce in deserted cities and closed
factories to severing critical rail transportation links. This is fully
described in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "The War Against
Japanese Transportation, 1941-1945," (Washington: Transportation Division,
May 1947). For a sketch with background on the politics see Gian P. Gentile,
_How Effective is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned From World War II to
Kosovo_ (New York: New York University Press, 2001).
For a truly excellent long article covering the whole
Pacific strategic bombing campaign I recommend Alvin D. Coox, "Strategic
Bombing in the Pacific, 1942-1945," in _Case Studies in Strategic
Bombardment_, ed. R. Cargill Hall (Washington: Air Force History and Museums
Program, 1998), pp. 258-381,
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